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RECENT DECISIONS
Federal Income Taxation: Tax Accounting: When a Cash
Basis Taxpayer Should Deduct Prepaid Insurance Premiums-The
petitioner, a corporation, was engaged in the business of ownership and
management of real estate. In 1950, 1951, and 1952 it purchased insurance coverage for its holdings and deducted in the year of purchase the
full amount of the premium paid, although the coverage extended a
number of years beyond the year of payment. The taxpayer, since its incorproation in 1905, had consistently followed this practice of deducting
as a business expense, the entire prmieum in the year it was paid. The
taxpayer utilized the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting and reported its income on the same basis. The Commissioner
disallowed the deduction and under the authority of Commissioner v.
Boylston Market Association/ contended that the cost of prepaid insurance must be prorated over the term of the insurance. The Commissioner's position was upheld by the Tax Court which followed the
Boylston Market case.2 Held: Judgment reversed. Prepaid insurance
premiums are an "ordinary and necessary" business expense which may
be deducted in full in the year of purchase. Waldheim Realty and Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 245 F. 2d 823 (8th Cir. 1957).
The question as to when a cash basis taxpayer should deduct prepaid insurance premiums has been a source of controversy for some
time and is reflected in three conflicting appellate decisions on the
subject. These decisions are the instant case, the Boylston Market
case, and Welch v. DeBlois.3 Prior to 1938 the Commissioner ruled
that the cost of prepaid insurance must be prorated. 4 In 1938 he
reversed his position to conform with the DeBlois case, which held that
prepaid insurance was not a capital asset the cost of which must be
amortized, but an "ordinary and necessary" business expense.5 In 1943
the Commissioner reverted to his original position requiring proration
following the Boylston Market case, a 1942 decision which overruled
the DeBlois decision, and held prepaid insurance to be a capital asset.6
In the instant case, the court treats the problem of qualifying an
expenditure for prepaid insurance as an ordinary business expense
under sec. 23(a) (1) (A) of the 1939 Code as a dual one. 7 First, it
decides that prepaid insurance may be distinguished from other capital
assets, in spite of extended coverage, and hence is not subject to pro1 131 F.2d 966 (1st
2 Waldheim Realty

Cir. 1942).
and Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1216 (1956).
394 F.2d 842 (lst Cir. 1938).
4 G.C.M. 13148 XIII, 1 Cum. BULL. 67 (1934).
5 G.C.M. 20307 1938, 1 CuM. BULL. 157 (1938).
6G.C.M. 23587 1943, Cum. BULL. 213 (1943).
7TNT. REV. CODE §23(a) (1) (A)
(1939). "In computing net income-therf
shall be allowed as deductions: All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, ....
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ration via amortization deductions. The court states that the basis for
the distinction is that:
"The payment of the insurance premiums adds nothing to
the taxpayer's plant or equipment or his ability to produce income. In this respect the insurance premiums differ from prepaid rent, lease bonuses and commissions, as such expenditures
are not for the purpose of providing the taxpayer the place in
which to carry on his business.""s
After ruling that prepaid, insurance was not a capital asset, the court
then determined that such a deduction would not distort the taxpayer's
income to an extent which would permit disallowance by the Commissioner under the authority of sec. 41 and sec. 43 of the 1939 Code.0 To
prove its point, the court goes to some length to illustrate statistically
that, in the long run, the taxpayer in the instant case would pay approximately the same amount of taxes, regardless of which method of deduction was used. In other words, the court is saying that in the absence
of distortion the taxpayer's method of accounting determines the timing
of the deductions and he cannot be forced to adopt the accrual method
of accounting which would necessitate a ratable deduction over the
term of the coverage under sec. 23(a) (1) (A).
In contrast to the dual approach of the instant case, the court in the
Boylston Market case, disregards the possibility of forcing a cash basis
taxpayer to use an accrual approach and simply rules that prepaid insurance is a capital asset. It reasons that the life of the asset extends
beyond the taxable year and hence its cost must be recovered by amortization allowances. For, to permit the taxpayer to take a full deduction
would result in distortion of income as the cost of the asset is chargeable to several years income.' 0 The court compares prepaid insurance
to such cost items as prepaid rent,:" bonuses for the acquisition of
leases,'12 bonuses for the cancellation of leases," and commissions for
8 245 F.2d at 825.
9 INT. REv. CODE §41 (1939): "The net income shall be computed upon the

basis of the taxpayer's annual accounting period-in accordance with the
method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of the taxpayer; but-if the method employed does not clearly reflect the incoine, the
computation shall be made in accordance with such nethod as in the opinion
of the Commissioner does clearly reflect income." [Emphasis added]
INT. REV. CODE §43 (1939); "The deductions and credits-provided for in

this chapter shall be taken for the taxable year in which 'paid or accrued'

or 'paid and incurred' dependent upon the method of accounting upon the
basis of which the net income is computed, unless in order to clearly reflect
the income the deduction or credit should be taken as of a different period."

[Emphasis added.]
'0 The Tax Court has held that insurance for a one year period is an expense

deductible in full at time of purchase although it carries protection for part
of a subsequent year. Kauai Terminal Ltd., 36 B.T.A. 893 (1937); Irene
L. Bell, 13 T.C. 344 (1949).
11 Baton Coal Co. v. Comm., 51 F.2d 469 (3rd Cir. 1931).
12 Home Trust Co. v. Comm., 65 F.2d532 (8th. Cir. 1933).

13 Steele-Wedeles Co., 30 B.T.A. 841 (1934).
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negotiating leases,14 all of which are normally considered to be capital
expenditures, and states that there is no essential difference between
them and prepaid insurance.
From the above discussion it can be seen that there are two conflicting views as to the treatment of prepaid insurance. One view is
that prepaid insurance is not a capital asset and where consistent practice obviates any distortion of income, the taxpayer's method of accounting prevails. Hence, a cash basis taxpayer cannot be forced to
amortize the cost of the insurance nor ratably deduct it and thus in
effect adopt the accrual method of accounting. The other position, of
course, is that prepaid insurance is a capital asset, for the life of the
asset extends beyond the taxable year and hence, distortion of income
is inevitable for the expenditure is chargeable to the income of more
than one year. The Commissioner, it would appear, has adopted a
middle ground position, for while he concurs in the result of the
Boylston Market case, he has taken the stand in his rulings that the cost
of prepaid insurance should be deducted ratably as an ordinary business expense.' 5 In other words, he feels that the cash basis taxpayer
should be forced to adopt the accrual method of accounting as far as
prepaid insurance is concerned. 6 This type of approach would, for all
practical purposes, yield the same result as the Boylston Market case,
although via a different statutory route.
The issue, basic to all of the above positions, appears to be in the
definition of the word "expense" in sec. 23(a) (1) (A) of the 1939
Code. Can it be said that an expenditure which is chargeable to more
than one year's income fits the discription of an "expense" because of
the taxpayer's method of accounting, or will the fact that it is chargeable to income of several years disqualify it, because of inherent distortion, in spite of the method of accounting? In addition to the basic
issue, there is also the question of how the expenditure should be
treated if disqualified for full deduction under sec. 23(a) (1) (A).
Should the expenditure be considered capital and hence subject to
amortization, or should the cash basis taxpayer be required to take
ratable business expense deductions?
In suport of the contention that an expenditure for prepaid insurance does not fit the definition of an ordinary business expense, the
following factors are of importance. Sections 23(1) and 24(a) (2) and
(3) of the 1939 Code which determine the treatment of capital expenBonwit Teller and Co. v. Comm., 53 F.2d 381 (2nd Cir. 1931).
15 In G.C.M. 13148 XIII,1 CuM. BULL. 67 (1934), pertaining to prepaid insurance and the cash basis taxpayer, section 41 of the 1939 Code is quoted and
is followed by the statement: "In order to reflect clearly the income of such
taxpayer, only the amounts applicable to carrying such insurance for the
taxable year constitute an ordinary and necessary expense in the earning of
the incame for that year." [Emphasis added].
16 Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. §1. 461-1(a) (1) (1956).
14
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ditures, are silent as to the precise definition of a capital asset. In fact,
the latter section would on its face deny any deduction at all, although
its intention is merely to prevent the full deduction in the year of
purchase.17 Hence it can be seen that the determination of whether an
expenditure is capital or not will depend upon the judicial interpretation of the word "expense" in sec. 23(a) (1) (A). In cases involving
cost items such as prepaid rent, bonuses for the acquisition of leases,
bonuses for the cancellation of leases, and commissions for negotiating
leases, the courts have clearly held that sums spent for the acquisition
of assets which have a life beyond the taxable year are capital expenditures and do not qualify as "expense" for the expenditures are chargeable to more than one year's income.' The basic reasoning for this
holding, of course, is the assumption that a full deduction will distort
income, and hence the solution is proration under sec. 23(1) regardless
of which method of accounting the taxpayer uses. It can be clearly
seen that if proration of prepaid insurance is justified by this reasoning, the decision is not based on explicit statutory authority, but rather
on the judicial interpretation of the word "expense" in sec. 23(a) (1)
(A). (The question of whether a consistent practice of full deduction
will obviate distortion will be treated later.)
The court in the instant case attempts to evade this interpretation
by distinguishing prepaid insurance from the expenditures mentioned
above on the ground that insurance is not income producing. This distinction, however, appears to be dubious and it would seem that the
court is drawing a line between direct and indirect income producing
assets rather than between income and non-income producing assets.
In addition, the basic issue of income distortion is ignored by such a
distinction.
Another approach which will yield approximately the same result,
namely proration, is that of considering prepaid insurance an ordinary
business expense, but one which the cash basis taxpayer must deduct
ratably over the term of the insurance as if he were on an accrual basis.
This is apparently the position of the Commissioner although he has
hedged in the instant case and depended upon the Boylston Market
decision as authority for proration. In this approach the judicial inter17 INT. REV. CODE

§23 (1) (1939): "In computing net income-there shall be al-

lowed as deductions: A reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear, and
tear-(1) of property used in the trade or business, or (2) of property held
for the production of income."
INT. REv. CODE

18

§24(a) (2) (3) (1939): "In computing net income no deduc-

tion shall in any case be allowed in respect of :-(2)
any amount paid
out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made
to increase the value of any property or estate except expenditures for the
development of mines or deposits deductible under section 23 (ee) ; (3) any
amount expended in restoring property or in making good the exhaustion
thereof for which an allowance is or has been made;
See notes 11, 12, 13, and 14 supra.
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pretation of the word "expense" in sec. 23 (a) (1) (A), will again play
a prominent role, for it is necessary that "expense" be limited to a
charge against the income of the current year, or otherwise the cash
basis taxpayer's method of accounting will control the timing of the
deduction under the general rule of sec. 41 and sec. 43. However, with
the definition of "expense" so limited, because of the distortion inherent in charging one year's income with another year's expense, it would
appear that the Commissioner would have authority under the qualifying clauses of sec. 41 and sec. 43 to disregard the taxpayer's method of
accounting and require prorated sec. 23(a) (1) (A) deductions.' 9 This
would, in effect, force the taxpayer from a cash to an accrual basis
insofar as prepaid insurance is concerned.
In support of this theory we have the following language of the
committee reports of both the House and Senate when the qualifying
clause of sec. 43 was added in the Revenue Act of 1924.
". .. the necessity for such a provision arises in cases in
which a taxpayer pays in one year interest or rental payments or
other items for a period of years. If he is forced to deduct the
amount in the year in which paid, it may result in a distortion of
his income which will cause him to pay either more or less taxes
than he properly should.

' 20

[Emphasis added]

While the above portion of the legislative history of sec. 43 does
not, in terms, include prepaid insurance within its scope, it would seem
that such an inclusion would be in keeping with the spirit of the report.
The court in the instant case seek to avoid such a result under the
qualifying clauses of sec. 41 and sec. 43 by attempting to prove statistically that in the long run there will be no distortion of income if the
taxpayer consistently follows the practice of deducting prepaid insurance premiums entirely in the year of payment. While it does not
specifically state, it can reasonably be inferred from the decision that
th court is restricting its ruling to instances where a taxpayer has regularly deducted prepaid premiums for a considerable number of years,
so as to rule out short run tax advantages. Such an inference is substantiated by the following statement of the court:
"We do not have before us the question of whether, under
appropriate circumstances, a cash basis taxpayer who regularly,
upon his books and in his tax returns charges as a business expense each year only a prorated portion of his insurance expense
would thereby properly reflect his income. We express no
opinion on the issue. Some flexibility is essential in the administration of the tax laws." 21 [Emphasis added]

§43 (1939): " . . . . unless in order to clearly reflect the income the deductions or credits should be taken as of a different period."
20 S. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1924); 1939-1 Cum. BULL.-276
(1939). H. R. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1924); 1939-1 Cum.
BULL.-251 (1939).
21245 F.2d at 828.
19 INT. REV. CODE
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From the above language- it appears that the court is using the past
practice of the taxpayer as its criterion as to which method of deduction is allowable. In other words, habitual usage tends to validate either
method. Such a test is flexible as the court intimates, but it would seem
that flexibility is attained only by sacrificing consistency and certainty.
The taxpayer who has had prior insurance dealings will constantly be
faced with the problem of determining whether his past practice was of
sufficient duration to support his method of deduction, while the first
time purchaser of prepaid insurance will be completely at sea as to
when he may take his deductions. It must be remembered that not all
taxpayers will have the past experience of the petitioner in the instant
case, and even in such a situation distortion ispossible if the taxpayer
should withdraw from the insurance market.
In support of the contention that an expenditure for prepaid insurance is deductible in full in the year of purchase by the cash basis
taxpayer, it should be noted that insurance costs for a year or less are
concededly a proper business deduction under sec. 23(a) (1) (A). 22 In
effect then, a cash basis taxpayer will be forced to adopt the accrual
method of accounting if such an otherwise "ordinary and necessary"
expense is called either a capital expenditure or a ratable business expense simply because of the extended coverage. Sections 41 and 43
of the 1939 Code lay down the general rule that the timing of a deduction is dependent upon the method of accounting used, and under these
sections the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting is
permissible. The reason for its permissibility is the fact that it is a
simple, uncomplicated system of accounting, well adapted to needs of
the majority of taxpayers. In other words, simplicity is the essence of
the system and while it does not reflect income as accurately as the
accrual method, the distortion is tolerated because of this simplicity.
Therefore it would seem to be a poor policy decision to force a cash
basis taxpayer to switch to an accrual basis in regard to prepaid insurance, for by such a move the simplicity of the cash system has been
destroyed, and that is the very justification for its existence in the tax
field.
Some changes have been made in the applicable sections of the
1954 Code, but none seems radical enough to definitely settle the controversy surrounding the timing of the deduction of prepaid insurance
premiums. Sections 162(a), 167(a), 263(a) and 446(a), (b) of the
1954 Code are substantially the same as their respective counterparts in
the 1939 Code, namely sections 23(a)(1)(A), 23(1), 24(a)(2)(3),
and 41. The one change of note is in sec. 43 of the 1939 Code which
reappears in the 1954 Code as sec. 461 (a) without the qualifying phrase
"unless in order to clearly reflect the income the deductions or credits
22U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39, 23(a) (1953).
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should be taken of a different period. '2 3 This omission, however, is
offset by the following words found in the Senate Finance Committee
Report on sec. 461(a) :
"Section 461 adopts the provisions of section 43 of the 1939
Code in rearranged form. The timing of deductions and credits,
otherwise allowable, is determined by the taxpayer's method of
accounting. The method must clearly reflect the income of the
' 24
[Emphasis added]
taxpayer."

The omission is further offset by the existence of sec. 446(b) in the
1954 Code, for it would seem that this section would provide sufficient
authority for an exception to the general rule that the accounting
25

method determines the time of deduction.

In conjunction with sec. 446(b), it is worthy to note that a literal
reading of the statute gives the impression that the Commissioner is
vested with discretionary powers in regard to the method of accounting
to be used in a particular case, only if there is distortion of income. In
other words, the Commissioner may exercise discretion as to the accounting method once it has been determined that the taxpayer's present
method of accounting does not clearly reflect income, but it would
seem that the Commissioner is not given unlimited discretion in determining whether income is or is not clearly reflected by the present
method, for as an end result his judgment is subject to judicial review.
Such an interpretation is not rebutted by the legislative history of the
section.2 6 In contrast to this construction is the following excerpt from
the legislative history of sec. 43 of the 1939 Code:
"In subdivision (d) of this section authority is granted to the
Commissioner to allow or require deductions and credits to be
taken as of a year other than that in which 'paid or accrued,'
when, in his opinion, it is necessary in order to cleraly reflect
income."27 [Emphasis added]
The above portion of the House and Senate Committee report
concerns the addition of the qualifying clause to sec. 43 in 1924 and it
is clear that under such section the Commissioner had discretion as to
the method of accounting to be used when income was not clearly reCODE OF 1954, §446(b) : "The amount of any deduction or credit
allowed by this subtitle shall be taken for the taxable year which is the proper
taxable year under the method of accounting used in computing the taxable
income."
24 S.Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 324 (1954).
25 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §446(b): "If no method of accounting has been
regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect
income, the computation of taxable income shall be made under such method
as, in the opinion of the Secretary or his delegate, does clearly reflect income."
26 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 319 (1954); House Rep. No. 1337,
83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 280 (1954).
27 See note 20 supra.
23 INT. REV.
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flected by the present method of accounting, and as to when the present
method did or did not clearly reflect income. While this issue has not
been taken up squarely by any court as yet, there are cases such as the
instant case and Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner2 where the
court has taken it upon itself to decide when there is or is not distortion
of income. As the law stands today, there is a clear split in the Circuits,
the instant case being handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals of
the Eighth Circuit and the Boylston decision by the U.S. Court of
Appeals of the First Circuit. Hence, it is difficult to forecast which
rule will ultimately prevail if the Supreme Court undertakes to resolve
the conflict. While there are strong policy reasons for the result of the
instant case, there would seem to be abundant authority for a contrary
ruling.
ALFRED A. HEON
Unauthorized Practice: Conveyancing as Practice of Law Under
Sec. 59.513, Wis. Stats.-On May 8, 1957 the Wisconsin Legislature
published a statute which requires, as a condition of recordation,
that every domestic instrument other than a will or a court decree,
which in any way affects the title to or an interest in real property,
must incorporate the name of the draftsman.1
The legislative purpose in enacting such a statute is subtly towfold.
Mr. Phillip Haberman, 2 one of the draftsmen of the bill, has pointed
out in a discussion of the bill with the present author, that the bill was
intended to facilitate the detection of those who are drafting such instruments in violation of sec. 256.30(2),3 as well as to enable any examiner of such instruments to contact its draftsman to resolve certain
ambiguities. Wisconsin, like all other states, has adopted a system of
well-defined licensing requirements for the practice of law. 4

The

28218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955).
1 Wis. STATS. §59.513 "Including name of person drafting instrument:
(1) No instrument by which the title to real estate of any interest
therein or lien thereon, is conveyed, created, encumbered, assigned, or
otherwise disposed of, shall be recorded by the register of deeds unless
the name of the person who, or governmental agency which, drafted
such instrument is printed, typewritten, stamped or written thereon
in a legible manner. An instrument complies with this section if it contains a statement in the following form: 'This instrument was drafted
'
[name]
by
(2) This section does not apply to an instrument executed before the
effective date of this section, nor to
(a) A decree, order, judgment, or writ of any court
(b) A will or death certificate
(c) An instrument executed or acknowledged outside of this state."
2Secretary of Wisconsin Bar Association.
3 "It is presumed that the bill is aimed at persons drawing documents who
have not been admitted to the practice of law in Wisconsin." From a letter
signed by the "Sec'ry-Wis. Recorders Ass'n" found in the Official
Drafting Record of §59.513.
4 Wis. STATS.

§256.28 (1955).

